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Abstract
This paper analyzes aggregate level biographical outcomes of gay and lesbian movements,
focusing on collective identity as a biographical outcome in the broader population, the impact of
cultural and policy change on life course outcomes, and generational/cohortial variations. I use
this case both to point to how biographical outcomes for gay and lesbian movements differ from
those for other movements and to make a general argument about biographical outcomes at the
aggregate level, focusing on outcomes for beneficiary constituencies. I focus first on collective
identity definition and diffusion as conditioned by cohort for both participants and nonparticipants. I then look at how cultural and policy outcomes affect the lifecourse of the
beneficiary constituency, LGB people. I focus on the following lifecourse outcomes:
employment and earnings; couplehood and marriage; and parenting.

As social change occurs, individuals’ lives are altered. Whether produced by social
movements or other forces, social change can affect the demography, lifecourse, and life chances
of participants or of populations as a whole (Goldstone and McAdam 2001). Most empirical
and conceptual work on how social movements affect biography focuses on effects on movement
participants, who experience a range of lasting effects, as the introduction to this section
describes. Movements can also shape biographical outcomes for the larger population, or for
certain cohorts or demographics, what Giugni and McAdam (Goldstone and McAdam 2001;
Guigni 2004; McAdam 1999) term “aggregate biographical outcomes.” There is little research
on aggregate level biographical outcomes. Existing work suggests that they vary according to
cohort location, spreading from activists to the general population over time, as activists develop
“alternative conceptions of the life-course and related behavioral norms” which then spread to
subcultural locations such as college campuses, and finally diffuse to youth in general
(Goldstone and McAdam 2001). Such lifecourse outcomes are generational; cohorts who have
already begun trajectories of education, occupation, marriage, or childbearing are less likely to
be affected by new norms. Factors such as gender and class also likely shape aggregate
biographical outcomes; that is, social movements affect the lifecourse of different segments of
the population in different ways (Hagan and Hansford-Bowles 2005; Van Dyke, McAdam, and
Wilhelm 2000). As Giugni (2004) points out, such aggregate biographical outcomes are often
unintentional.
In contrast to the previous focus on unintended effects on the general population, I focus
on how social movements affect the lifecourse and biography of movement beneficiaries, the
group on whose behalf the movement seeks change. Such effects can be intentional, although
unintended effects also occur. Many social movements hope to change individuals’ lives by
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opening up education, job, and housing opportunities, and changing how people identify, feel,
and interact (Whittier 2009). These effects can occur despite the fact that most members of
beneficiary groups (such as women, African Americans, or lesbian/gay/bisexual (LGB) people)
do not participate in activism on their behalf and need not agree or identify with the relevant
movement. Beneficiaries are affected in different ways and through different mechanisms than
activists themselves. Participants’ biographies are shaped by their immersion in activism and
movement networks, collective identities, and ideological commitments; beneficiaries’
biographies are shaped by movement outcomes. Ongoing participation in activism and lasting
political orientation are outcomes for movement veterans, but not for beneficiaries or the general
population. In contrast, when a movement successfully targets lifecourse patterns, as in the
women’s movement, changes in those patterns (lower marriage rates, later age of marriage,
greater women’s employment, norms of equity in relationships) are expected in the beneficiary
population as a whole (Gerson 2004).
The LGB movement provides a focused case through which to examine aggregate
biographical outcomes for beneficiaries. It targeted policy goals directly related to lifecourse and
biography, including employment and housing discrimination (affecting income, occupation, and
residence), marriage and domestic partnership, adoption, and childbearing. Its cultural goals – to
change societal views of LGB people and LGB people’s own sense of self – are also relevant to
aggregate biographical outcomes. Rapid social change around these issues cannot be attributed
solely to the movement (but see Fetner 2008; Stone 2012); however, because the changes
coincided closely with movement mobilization with no clear alternative drivers, we can assume
that the LGB movement accounts for a good measure of them.
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Aggregate biographical outcomes are part of the cultural and individual effects of
movements. Social movements attempt to produce change in culture and individuals, but these
changes are often very hard to track (Rochon 1998; Whittier 2009). As Giugni (2004) points out,
the vast majority of work on biographical outcomes focuses on the U.S., the movements of the
New Left, and the baby boomer cohort. The aggregate biographical outcomes of the LGB
movement are more recent in time and cohort.
The LGB movement emerged in the U.S. on a large scale in the late 1960s, grew steadily
throughout the 1970s, diversified and institutionalized organizationally and in movement
communities during the 1980s (partly in response to the AIDS epidemic), and has continued to
be vital at organizational, community, and protest levels throughout the 1990s and 2000s
(Armstrong 2002; Ghaziani 2008). Substantial change has occurred over time in collective
identity (Bernstein 1997; Ghaziani 2011; Taylor and Whittier 1992), the inclusion of both
genders, bisexual people, and transgender people (Gamson 1995; Ghaziani 2008), tactics (Taylor
et al. 2009), goals, and organizational development and institutionalization (Armstrong 2002).
My focus is on the lesbian and gay movement. Despite the inclusion of transgender issues
under the acronym “LGBT” and in some movement organizations, the transgender movement and
its outcomes proceeded differently and require a distinct analysis (Stone 2009a; Stone 2009b). In
contrast, I include bisexuals in “LGB” to recognize that these outcomes affect anyone in a samesex relationship, regardless of sexual identity. Substantial division exists in the LGB movement
over precisely the biographical outcomes under discussion here: whether LGB people ought to
seek legal marriage or model relationships differently; whether childraising, like marriage,
represents undesirable assimilation into a mainstream model of family; whether employment in
mainstream occupations is desirable; and whether residence in gay enclaves is
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preferable to residential assimilation. These debates, in general, center around the creation and
preservation of a non-normative culture versus assimilation into mainstream culture. These are
not simply questions of strategy and ideology, but of lifecourse.
Consequently, some lifecourse changes may be similar for activists and beneficiaries as a
whole, but many likely differ. For example, continued residence in a gay neighborhood after the
mainstreaming of residence patterns may be more likely for movement participants.
Identification as “queer” rather than gay or lesbian, or (in the earlier period) as gay or lesbian
rather than homosexual or homophile may occur both earlier and to a greater degree among
activists vs. the general population. Further, the diffusion processes from activists to the general
population differs. Activist and subcultural norms for relationships and lifecourse focused on
critiquing conventional family patterns, while the policy outcomes tended to extend access to
conventional family forms of marriage and legal kinship bonds with children, rather than nonnuclear families and chosen kin (Weston 1991).
Despite the debates, many movement outcomes have been policies that extend access to
normative marriage, family, employment and residence. In addition to policy change, two kinds
of cultural outcomes affect individuals biographically: changing definitions of LBG collective
identity and calls to come out; and increased social tolerance, facilitating coming out and entry
into integrated social settings. Data for most arenas are imperfect. The US Census and
American Community Survey, the best sources of information on most variables of interest, do
not measure sexual identity and thus permitting assessment of same-sex couples but not single
LGB people. Changes over time in how same-sex couples are enumerated further complicates
matters. Because few comprehensive data sources on LGB people exist, the paper draws on
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multiple sources to piece together lifecourse patterns; I clarify data sources and limitations
throughout where relevant.
I will first assess effects of cultural changes and then move to employment, residence,
marriage, and parenting. Table One provides an overview of the evidence for the expected
aggregate biographical outcomes associated with each specific movement outcome. [Table One
about here.]

EFFECTS OF CULTURAL CHANGE ON COLLECTIVE IDENTITY AND COMING OUT
Collective identity is an important biographical outcome for movement participants. For
some movements, including gay and lesbian movements, the production, definition, and
diffusion of collective identity is also an important biographical outcome in the larger population
(Bernstein 1997; Taylor and Whittier 1992). Gay and lesbian movements sought – and largely
succeeded – to encourage individuals to define themselves proudly as gay or lesbian and to
“come out,” disclosing their identity publicly. They saw this as a strategy for changing attitudes
about homosexuality, and as a change in itself, enabling individuals to shed shame and live
openly. Not only participants adopted these new collective identities and disclosed them
publicly, but LGB people in general.
The label and associated meaning of the collective identity produced by LGB movements
varies over time, and thus by cohort or generation (Ghaziani 2011; Whittier 1997). A short
sampling of identity terms used by lesbian and gay people since the mid-1900s exemplifies this:
gay, homophile, lesbian, butch, femme, stud, lesbian feminist, gay liberationist, GLBT, queer.
The terms carry different meanings about gender, assimilation, sexuality, and commonality with
other sexual minorities. “Queer,” for example, implies commonalities of sexuality over gender,
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in contrast to “lesbian,” which in turn emphasizes similarities between women who are attracted
to other women over the differences in sexual practice and gender presentation highlighted by
“butch” or “fem.” The identities characterize different periods in the movement and, following
the diffusion model, each was first constructed by activists, and later spread to non-participants
(Goldstone and McAdam 2001; McAdam 1999). Ultimately, diffusion of identity terms and
definitions to the larger culture produces cultural change (Rochon 1998; Whittier 2009).
Collective identity has implications for lifecourse. For example, Ghaziani (2011) suggests that a
recent shift toward a “post-gay” collective identity promotes a sense of commonality with
heterosexuals and assimilation into mainstream organizations and life paths, in contrast to earlier
eras that stressed cultural uniqueness and solidarity.
One way of tapping changes in identity terms over time is through the Google Books data
analysis tool Ngrams. A graph of major identity terms shows the change over time. Figure One
shows the terms, “gay, lesbian, queer, LGBT, and GLBT” from 1970 to 2008. 1

Figure One: Identity Terms’ Relative Prevalence in American English-Language Books, 19702008
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All the terms except “homosexual” increased during this period, with “gay” and “lesbian”
following similar patterns; “queer” began a rise in the early 1990s, “bisexual” peaked briefly in
1995, and the acronyms enjoyed only a small, brief rise in the 2000s. “Homosexual” was
replaced as the dominant term by “gay” and “lesbian” by 1992. The publication of books on
LGB topics is an outcome of the movement (see Arthur 2009), as is the growth in these books of
terms preferred by activists over “homosexual.”
Publications are one means by which identity terms diffuse to the larger culture where
they are available for adoption by non-participants. “Queer,” for example, is commonly adopted
as a self-descriptor by college students who encounter it in their course work via “queer theory,”
whereas, in earlier cohorts, primarily activists adopted it through the work of the groups Queer
Nation and ACT UP. Some individuals now choose “queer” if they want an indeterminate,
umbrella term (Ghaziani 2008; Ghaziani 2011; Seidman 2002). By producing, redefining, and
promulgating collective identities, activists changed the self-definitions available more broadly.
Declaring identity publicly through the process of coming out was understood by many
as both activism and personal transformation (Whittier 2012). Movement strategy emphasized
coming out, not just for activists but for all LGB people, through events such as National
Coming Out Day (which became widespread around 1990). These strategies preceded an
increase in disclosure of gay/lesbian identity, although causation is hard to establish. Seidman
(2002) documents increasing openness by LGB people, finding that even people who said they
were closeted were out to many people.
Survey data confirm the pattern. 2 Increasing percentages of the US public report
knowing someone who is gay or lesbian or having a close friend or family member who is gay
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or lesbian. Some of this increase is due to greater social integration, but most is due to increased
visibility, or coming out. Polls (which use varying wording) show a clear shift from a relatively
small number of people who say they know someone who is gay or lesbian to well over half
(“Polling Report” 2012; Yang 1997). Prior to the mid-1990s, fewer than 1/3 of respondents said
they knew any gay or lesbian person; by 1998, 59% said they had a family member, close friend,
or acquaintance who was gay or lesbian. The number increased to 63% in 2010.
Increased coming out is both a biographical outcome for gay and lesbian people who live
their lives more openly and a sign of cultural change more generally. Coming out itself has
diverse biographical consequences, ranging from discrimination, rejection or acceptance by
family, enhanced sense of personal worth, emotional transformations (from shame to pride), and
entry into movement or community institutions (bars, coffee shops, activist organizations)
(Seidman 2002). These consequences are conditioned by changes in LBG life more generally.
Contact with openly lesbian and gay people is associated with more favorable attitudes
toward homosexuality (Lemm 2006). In addition, media visibility of lesbian and gay characters
increased during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Some polling suggests that media visibility
contributed to increased social tolerance (Brewer 2003; Riggle and Ellis 1996).
Public opinion has shifted steadily in favor of a range of policies related to LGB rights. At
the most basic level, the percentage of the US population who say that sexual relations between
two adults of the same sex (GSS) are “not wrong at all” fluctuated between 11 and 14% from
1973 to 1991, but then began a steady increase to around 30% by 2002-2006, 36% in 2008, and
41% in 2010 (Smith 2011). Public support for same-sex marriage has also increased rapidly,
from a low of 10.7% (combined strongly agree and agree) in when the question was first asked
in 1988 to 30% in 2004, 35% in 2006, 39% in 2008, 46% in 2010, and 54% in 2012 (Burns and
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Harris 2012; Smith 2011). By 2010, half of people age 18-29 said homosexual behavior is not
wrong at all, and 64.2% supported same sex marriage (Smith 2011), a number that increased to
73% in 2012 (Burns and Harris 2012). 3 These cultural outcomes foster biographical change,
encouraging further identity disclosure and collective identities that emphasize similarity to
rather than difference from heterosexuals (Ghaziani 2011), migration out of LGB enclaves
(Ghaziani 2010), and open relationships and child-raising. Because of the marked cohort
differences in attitudes toward homosexuality, it is likely that these lifecourse patterns are more
common among younger LGB people than their older counterparts. In a feedback loop, such
lifecourse changes further the cultural shift.

POLICY OUTCOMES AND THE LIFECOURSE
Central elements of the lifecourse have changed for LGB people over the past twenty to
thirty years in direct response to related policy changes. For each arena, I will first describe the
policy changes and then examine evidence of related lifecourse change.

Anti-Discrimination Ordinances and Outcomes for Employment and Residential Patterns
Law barring discrimination against LGBT people, non-existent in the US before the late
1970s, expanded dramatically from the 1990s to the 2010s. Figure 2 shows the number of states
with anti-discrimination ordinances covering either sexual orientation alone, or sexual
orientation and gender expression.
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Similar expansion occurred in companies’ internal non-discrimination policies and samesex spousal benefits. Between 2000 to 2003, 75 Fortune 500 companies added domestic partner
benefit coverage; by 2006, half of Fortune 500 companies provided health benefits to same-sex
partners and 86% had non-discrimination policies (Badgett 2008). In 2001, while only 15% of
gays and lesbians worked in organizations that offered partner health benefits, 52% were in
organizations that welcomed same-sex partners at social events, and only 18% in organizations
that did not (Ragins and Cornwell 2007). 4 Women, whites, and the more highly educated were
most likely to be in jobs that offered partner benefits, but the differences between groups were
not large (Ragins and Cornwell 2007).
Because non-discrimination laws and policies affect access to employment,
compensation, and housing, we would expect they might produce changes in employment and
10

occupation, income, and residential patterns. Note, however, that a majority of US states have
no such law, meaning that discrimination against LGBT people remains legal; as such, lifecourse
effects are limited.

Biographical Outcomes: Employment and Income
Gay men earn less than heterosexual men, with a larger gap relative to married than
unmarried heterosexual men. Although some evidence suggests that gay men disproportionately
enter lower earning predominantly female occupations, the wage gap is not readily explained by
differences in occupation (Badgett and King 1997; Badgett and Frank 2007). In contrast, on
average lesbians earn more than or the same as heterosexual women, perhaps because as primary
wage earners they work more hours, enter higher-paying gender nonconforming occupations, or
are less discriminated against or more closeted than gay men (Badgett and Frank 2007). At the
household level, female couples’ average household income is similar to that of married
heterosexual couples, while male couples’ income is about $10,000/year higher. 5 Among samesex couples, both partners work fulltime more often than in heterosexual couples, explaining
their higher combined income, despite lower individual income (Lofquist 2011).
Evidence about the effects of non-discrimination policy on income is inconclusive. An
early study showed that the gay-straight wage gap was no lower in places with nondiscrimination laws (Klawitter and Flatt 1998). Badgett and Frank (2007) attribute this to lack of
enforcement or insufficient time for non-discrimination law to affect income and occupation. At
the employer level, company non-discrimination policies and partner benefits appear to affect
identity disclosure and wellbeing, if not earnings (Badgett 2001). Workers were also more likely
to be out at work if they perceived their workplace as supportive, partners were welcome at work

11

events, and coworkers’ reactions were good (Badgett 2001; Ragins and Cornwell 2007).
Regardless of whether workers were out or not, those whose employers offered health benefits
were more committed to and happier at their employer, and even more so when their partners
were welcome at work events.
In sum, non-discrimination laws and employment policies seem not to have affected
income or occupation, except – importantly – through partner benefits, a form of compensation.
Cohorts entering the workforce before the late 1990s established work trajectories without
benefit of the ordinances, which would have a stronger effect on more recent cohorts, those now
around 30-35 years old. Over time, we may see stronger effects, particularly if a federal antidiscrimination law is passed.

Biographical Outcomes: Residence and housing patterns
Although housing is covered by non-discrimination ordinances, residential patterns are
driven more by other forces. There are two main types of shifts in LGB residence patterns:
regional migration, and migration into and out of gay or lesbian neighborhoods. In both cases,
we see over time first a concentration, and then a dispersion as discrimination and cultural
disapproval decrease. Well-documented migrations to the coasts and port cities occurred
following the second World War, establishing gay enclaves in many major cities (D'Emilio
1998). Following the policy and cultural changes of the 1980s and 1990s, these patterns may be
shifting.
Regionally, while most states’ rankings on concentration of same-sex couples remained
stable from 1990 to 2006, several states’ rankings increased, notably Utah, Delaware, and New
Mexico, none of which are historically gay-friendly (Gates 2007). The larger increases in same-
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sex couples in some regions is due partly to migration, but regional migration for same-sex
couples doesn’t differ substantially from migration patterns for the US population overall (Gates
2007). The apparent increases more likely reflect an increase in residents’ willingness to come
out, rather than a true increase in population. Gates (2007) argues that this is why the apparent
increase in gay and lesbian population is greatest in conservative areas that historically had
“bigger closets,” where more people were closeted in earlier surveys and came out in later ones.
This suggests a socially significant change in the individual lives of LGB residents in more
conservative regions.
Within cities, LGB residents historically formed gay. These enclaves flourished from the
1960s through the 1990s, but may be diminishing more recently (Ghaziani 2010). Many cities
still have consistently high concentrations of lesbian and gay residents, and “nine of the top ten
cities in concentration of gay and lesbian couples have remained the same from 1990-2006”
(Gates 2007; Gates and Ost 2004). However, in some cities, same-sex couples appear to be
moving out of the central city and into the suburbs. Gates (2007) shows that in three
metropolitan areas (Atlanta, Philadelphia and Detroit) the numbers of same-sex couples dropped
in the central city but increased in the larger metropolitan area, suggesting a move to the suburbs.
In sum, laws prohibiting discrimination in housing may have promoted some LGB
migration out of concentrated neighborhoods, but a more likely driver is increasing social
acceptance. Given the persistence of LGB concentration by region and city, the recency of the
residential shifts, and the evidence that increased identity disclosure explains some of the
apparent change, it is premature to conclude that LGB residential patterns are changing
dramatically.
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Marriage and Civil Unions
Marriage, as a legal, social, and financial institution, is an important part of the lifecourse.
Age and rate of marriage decreased for heterosexuals overall as an outcome of the New Left
movements (Goldstone and McAdam 2001; Guigni 2004; McAdam 1999). For the LGB
population, in contrast, marriage rates have increased because access to legal marriage is an
outcome of the movement. Figure 3 shows the number of states with various forms of legal
recognition for same-sex relationships over time: marriage; civil unions or domestic partnerships
granting many of the rights of marriage; and limited forms of relationship recognition such as
inheritance or hospital visitation. 6 (Note that the US does not recognize same-sex marriage at
the federal level, nor do most states recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states.)
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The biographical outcomes of interest are rates of coupling, rates of marriage, and
whether couples consider themselves spouses regardless of legal status. There is no accurate
way to tap changing rates of couplehood. The number of same-sex couples who reported
themselves on the Census or the American Community Survey increased dramatically between
1990 and 2010, but the increasing numbers of same-sex couples who report themselves as
unmarried partners may simply reflect increased willingness to come out on surveys along with
the Census’s changes in counting methods (Gates 2007; O’Connell and Feliz 2011).
Increases in the percentages of same-sex couples who report that they are spouses rather
than unmarried partners is likely due to availability of legal marriage, a social moment outcome.
Twenty percent of same-sex couples reported themselves as spouses on the 2010 Census, after
the legalization of same-sex marriage in some locales, compared to only 12% in 2000 (O'Connell
and Feliz 2011). In states with legal same-sex marriage, 42.4% of same-sex couples reported
they were spouses, vs. 28.2% for states with domestic partnership or civil unions, and 22.7% in
other states (Krivickas and Loftquist 2011; Lofquist 2011). In Massachusetts, the earliest state to
legalize same-sex marriage in 2004, 6.5% of same-sex couples listed themselves as spouses in
2000 vs. 46.7% in 2010, a dramatic change likely due to both actual legal marriages and changing
meanings available for categorizing relationships. The other states that legalized marriage did so
in 2008, 2009, and 2010, allowing less time for couples to marry before the 2010 survey, but also
showed substantial increases and higher percentages of couples reporting as spouses than the
national average. 7
Couples who reported they were spouses may not necessarily have legally recognized
marriages. The overall increase in the percentage of couples who consider themselves spouses
also points to a more general change in the cultural templates and labels available to same-sex
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couples. In fact, several conservative states where same-sex marriage is banned also have higher
than average percentages of same-sex couples reporting as married, so reporting a relationship as
spousal is not tightly linked to the law (Lofquist 2011). 8
Biographical outcomes vary among groups and cohorts (Van Dyke, McAdam, and
Wilhelm 2000; Whittier 1995). As with heterosexual couples, the mean age of married couples
is higher for lesbian and gay couples compared to unmarried partners, but the age difference is
smaller than for heterosexuals (Lofquist 2011) because most same-sex couples, regardless of age
or longevity of relationship, remained unmarried. Some groups are more likely to call their
same-sex relationships spousal. Compared to same-sex couples as a whole, higher percentages
Black/African American, American Indian/Alaskan Native, and Asian people, less educated
couples, non-interracial couples, and people with children in the household report that they are
married (Lofquist 2011). The presence of children in the household makes a particularly
dramatic difference for gay male couples: 25% of male couples reporting as spouses have
children, vs. 6.2% who report being unmarried. 9
In sum, LGB couples have become more likely to call themselves spouses following
legalization of marriage and civil unions. The increase is strongest in states where legalization of
marriage occurred, but exists elsewhere as well. Age or cohort differences in rate of marriage, if
any, are small, but age patterns in LGB marriages differ from heterosexual marriage. For
heterosexuals, marriage is part of a transition to adulthood and first marriage occurs early in life
and in the course of a relationship. (Note that there are substantial differences by race in these
patterns in the US.) LGB legal marriage, in contrast, occurred in all stages of relationships, with
longterm and newer couples marrying when it became legal. Over time, couples may marry
earlier in their relationship; this would be a notable cohort difference.
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Child-bearing and Adoption
Policy changes related to both adoption and biological childraising affect LGB parenting.
Two policy issues affect LGB people seeking to adopt children. First, couples where one parent
is the biological parent seek legal recognition for the second parent (“second-parent adoption”).
Second, couples seek to adopt children jointly. In 2012, 13 states permitted joint adoption by
same-sex couples and second-parent adoption. Prior to 1995 none did; most added these rights
after 2002. Thus, we see a significant change related to the lifecourse in a short period of time.
In regard to biological parenting, access to donor gametes and assisted reproduction (including
surrogacy) varies by agency; the professional associations for medical professionals issued
statements in support of access by LGB people in 2006 (Ethics Committee of the American
Society for Reproductive Medicine 2009).
If these changes affected aggregate biographical outcomes, we would expect increased
rates of parenting among LGB people. It is impossible to get solid numbers on the prevalence of
child-raising among lesbians and gay men, especially prior to 2000. Estimates in the 1970s and
early 1980s of lesbian mothers ranged from 30% to 45% of lesbians (including biological and
non-biological mothers, the latter of whom would not have had legal relationships to the
children). Many of these were raising children from prior heterosexual relationships (Gottler
1984). Virtually all gay fathers during this period had children from heterosexual relationships
because adoption by single men (regardless of sexuality) was very difficult and surrogacy was
not yet available. Both lesbians and gay men often lost custody battles to former spouses or
relatives. Custody cases gradually liberalized in the 1990s, allowing more gay and lesbian
parents to retain custody or visitation with children from prior heterosexual relationships. In
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tandem with larger cultural changes around LGB issues, this permitted a growing number of out
lesbian and gay parents.
By 1990, the Census showed that an estimated “22% of partnered lesbians and about 5%
of partnered gay men had children in their households” (Krivickas and Lofquist 2011). By 2008,
13.9% of male and 26.5 percent of female couples had children under 18 in their households,
compared to 43% of male-female couples (Lofquist 2011; see also Gates and Ost 2004). This is
a substantial increase over 1990, although changing methods of counting same-sex unmarried
partners make the precise change impossible to determine. Even higher percentages of all
lesbians and gay men (including those who are not coupled) have had children (including
children not currently living with them). In 2002, 35% of lesbians had given birth and 23% had
lived with and had responsibility for a child to whom they had not given birth; 16% of gay men
had children by birth or adoption (Gates et al. 2007). The number for lesbians increased to 49%
in 2008 (remaining the same for men) (Gates 2011). 10 Many more lesbians and gay men without
children wanted to have children. In 2002, 49% of lesbians and 57% of gay men who were not
parents wanted children (Gates et al. 2007). 11
The 2010 Census showed a slight decrease. 17.5% of same-sex couples – 10% of male
couples and 24% of female couples – had children in their households (Lofquist 2011;
O'Connell and Feliz 2011). 12 Gates (2011) argues that the decrease occurred despite dramatic
increases in the percentage of lesbians and gay men adopting children. Parenting rates among
lesbian and gay people include those who had biological children in mixed-sex relationships,
before they come out. As LGB people come out younger, they are less likely to have children in
heterosexual relationships, reducing the overall parenting rate. Instead, they are more likely to
have children after coming out via donor gametes or adoption.
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Regionally, the highest percentages of same-sex couples who are parents are in the East
and West South Central states, and the lowest in the Pacific and South Atlantic regions (Gates
2011). But for same-sex parents through adoption and foster care, the patterns differ, with more
in the more liberal New England, Mid-Atlantic, and West Coast states where gay adoption is
easier (Gates et al. 2007). African-American, Latino, and Native American/Alaskan Native
same-sex couples are more likely to have children, but adoptive parenting is much more common
among White same-sex couples. Adoptive parenting is more common among same-sex couples
with higher education, but parenting overall is more common among those with lower levels of
education (Gates 2011). These patterns suggest that parenting by choice through adoption is
more common among higher SES couples in more liberal states (which permit adoption by gay
or lesbian couples and second-parent adoption), while the reverse is true for having children
through prior heterosexual relationships.
Routes to parenthood differ for same-sex and heterosexual couples and have changed
over time. Adoption has become more common over time; 10% of same-sex couples with
children had adopted children in 2000, compared with 19% in 2009 (Gates 2011). Dramatically
more same-sex couples with children had only adopted or step-children (21.2%) or a
combination of biological children, step-children, and children from adoption (6%), for a total of
27.2%, than did heterosexual married couples (total 9.2%) or heterosexual unmarried couples
(total 12%) (Gates 2007). 13 “Four percent of all adopted children in the U.S. are being raised by
gay or lesbian parents” (Gates and Ost 2004), as are 3% of all children in foster care (Gates et al.
2007). About half of all adoptive same-sex families adopt children through the foster care
system, previously impossible, and 60% of adoption agencies will accept applications from LGB
parents, although only 40% reported having placed children with LGB parents (Kennedy 2011).
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Although there are substantial barriers to adoption remaining in a majority of states, very few
agencies would have worked with open LGB parents before 1990.
Routes to parenthood vary between lesbians and gay men, since biological reproduction
for gay men through surrogacy and egg donation is more expensive and complex than for
lesbians, who need only use donor sperm. For gay men, adoption is a major route to parenthood.
The increasing percentage of gay male couples with children is a clear result of the opening of
legal adoption to gay men in some states and agencies and “single” men in others. Adoption
remains more difficult for gay men than for lesbians, either as couples and because fewer
agencies or countries permit adoption by single men than by single women. Adopted children
living with male couples are much more likely to have disabilities and are older than those with
female couples, suggesting that male couples may be more likely to adopt harder-to-place
children (Gates et al. 2007). 14
Overall, parenting by choice by same-sex couples has become more common over time,
with liberalization of adoption law and availability of reproductive technology. Routes to
parenting have changed; biological childbearing through heterosexual relationships prior to
coming out has decreased, and adoption and use of donor gametes and surrogacy increased.
These trends are strongest in regions where adoption and foster care law and policy is more
liberal and where second-parent adoption is permitted. These changes are primarily due to LGB
movement policy gains on adoption and access to reproductive technology, as well as cultural
changes that led to earlier coming out.

CONCLUSIONS
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Overall, LGB movement outcomes included many that we would expect to influence
biography: the production of specific collective identities, increased cultural tolerance, nondiscrimination policies, legal recognition of same-sex couple relationships, and availability of
adoption and second-parent adoption. In most arenas, lifecourse patterns did shift: increased
numbers of LGB people disclosed identities publicly to family members, friends, and surveytakers; residential patterns dispersed; rates of legal marriage and the use of “marriage” and
“spouse” as terms increased; child-raising through adoption and reproductive technology
increased and (probably) child-bearing by LG people in prior heterosexual relationships
decreased. Employment non-discrimination ordinances appear to have little or no effect on
earnings or occupation, but company policies affect employees’ wellbeing and identity
disclosure, and effects on earnings or occupations may emerge over time. Importantly, in the
US, non-discrimination law is not the norm, most locales and the federal government prohibit
same-sex marriage, legal parenting remains difficult, and large portions of the public continues
to view same-sex behavior as morally wrong. Aggregate biographical outcomes, thus, are
limited.
Gay and lesbian movements are similar to other movements that seek to change the social
position of disadvantaged groups: their success in doing so changes the life course of the groups’
members. For example, feminist movements contributed to women’s access to some categories
of employment and perhaps to greater labor force participation, delayed marriage and childraising, and changes in gender divisions of labor within the household; immigrant rights
movements can affect residence, employment, and education. As with other movements, the
forces that shape aggregate life course outcomes for gay and lesbian people include broader
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changes in norms about relationships, marriage, childbearing, and disclosure of personal identity.
Disentangling these forces is a formidable methodological challenge.
Aggregate biographical outcomes among movement beneficiaries are shaped by gender,
race, class, and cohort. Because economic inequality plays out differently for lesbians and gay
men (with gay men earning more than lesbians, but having a larger wage gap compared to their
heterosexual counterparts), any effects of non-discrimination ordinances will likely vary by
gender. Because gay neighborhoods and migration to suburbs are sometimes structured by
gender and race, and class, residential patterns will vary accordingly. Routes to parenthood
differ for gay men and lesbians, and expansion of adoption rights was especially crucial for
increased parenting by gay men.
In terms of cohort, non-discrimination ordinances primarily affect people early in their
work history and access to parenthood is most relevant to the younger cohorts. Further, the
meanings of marriage and parenting may vary by cohort. For earlier cohorts of lesbians, the
definition of marriage as a patriarchal institution may lessen desire to enter it; and for earlier
cohorts of both genders, alternative relationship arrangements such as non-monogamy and
extended kinship/friendship networks that were normative in earlier eras may persist. Many
individuals in earlier cohorts of both lesbians and gay men may not have been interested in
parenting or may have assumed it was impossible; their attitudes toward increased parenting by
younger cohorts, therefore, may be mixed. For the cohorts entering young adulthood now, the
expectation of marriage and child-raising may become normative; marriage may be an expected
expression of a committed relationship, and parents and peers may ask when to expect babies
(Swarns 2012). This is a historically unique lifecourse experience for LGB people.
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Many of these biographical outcomes were explicit goals of the LGB movement, in
contrast to the lifecourse outcomes of the New Left movements, which were largely
unintentional (Guigni 2004). Earlier activists were more likely to embrace ideologies critical of
mainstreaming, while the policies they achieved led to increased mainstreaming by the general
LGB public. Nevertheless, many activists view them with mixed feelings, torn between support
for increasing legal and cultural equality and regret at the loss of distinctive cultural patterns and
communities, or are critical of what they regard as a mainstreaming and entry into normative
heterosexual patterns of family. Biographical outcomes, like other movement successes, are out
of the control of the activists who set them in motion (Whittier 2009).
Aggregate biographical outcomes are related to, but distinct from, movements’ policy
and cultural outcomes. Evident at the individual level, they follow from policy changes related
to the lifecourse and cultural changes in societal views of the group or its issues. My focus on
the lifecourse consequences for movement beneficiaries is distinct from previous work on
aggregate biographical outcomes. Whereas changes in the lifecourse patterns of overall
populations may be unintended, changes in beneficiaries’ biographies are an important part of
many movements’ goals. Assessing the degree of such changes is, therefore, crucial to
understanding movement outcomes.
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Notes
1

The following terms are omitted from the table but did not change results when included:

“homosexuality” (tracks closely with “homosexual” but is not an identity label), “LGB,” “GLB,”
“lesbian women,” “gay men” (very low frequency and LGB/GLB appear in other contexts).
Results from prior to 1970 are excluded because of the use of “gay” to mean happy and “queer”
to mean strange; both usages continued after 1970, but an examination of the results shows that
they are rare. Results after 2008 are omitted because the database is incomplete and results are
thus unstable.
2

Willingness to disclose on a survey is an indicator of coming out. Representative surveys

between 1988-1996 found that 1% of women and 2.5% of men identified as gay or lesbian
(Gates and Ost 2004). An estimate of the lesbian and gay population based on the 2000 US
Census is 2.5-3.8% of men and 1.3-1.9% of women. Comparing these estimates to the
proportions found in the nationally representative surveys suggest that 25-50% of women and 030% of men did not disclose their identity to the survey-takers.
3

The 2012 youngest cohort was 18-34 (Burns and Harris 2012).

4

Study based on random sample of members of gay, gay Latino, and gay African-American

organizations, stratified geographically.
5

Unmarried heterosexual couples’ income is substantially lower than other groups. Data, 2010

Census.
6

Numbers will be updated before book goes to press.

7

12% vs. 42.6% in Connecticut, 13.5% vs. 32.1% in CA (where marriage was legal only for a

few months in 2008), 0 vs. 46% in Iowa, 0 vs. 46.5% in New Hampshire, 6.7% vs. 34.1% in
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Vermont. States that permit registration of domestic partnership but not same-sex marriage do
not generally show a higher than average reporting as spouses.
8

It is possible that some of these are errors (O’Connell and Feliz 2011).

9

26.2% of lesbian couples reporting as spouses have children, vs. 23% of those reporting being

unmarried.
10

GSS data.

11

For bisexuals, the percentages were 75 (women), 70 (men).

12

Calculated from the supplemental tables in O’Connell and Feliz 2011. Using Census and ACS

data on unmarried same-sex partners with children at home, Gates shows a steady increase from
12.5% in 1990 to 18.8% in 2006, and then a decline to 16.2% in 2009.
13

Variations in numbers due to different data sources.

14

Note, however, that Gates, et al. 2007 do not have data on the age at adoption, only the age at

the time of the survey. 2000 Census data.
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Table One: Summary of Aggregate Biographical Outcomes
Movement Outcome
Successful promotion of
coming out
Cultural change: increased
tolerance
Production of identity
terms and definitions

Non-discrimination
ordinances (state level);

Expected Aggregate
Biographical Effect
Increased open-ness
about identity
Increased coming out;
“post-gay” identities
Self-identification
(specific terms,
meanings, and degree of
similarity/difference to
heterosexuals)
Decreased wage gap
(men);
Changing occupational
distribution

Evidence
Polls: more report knowing LGB
people;
Qualitative work: less closetedness
Polls: more report knowing LGB
people; Ghaziani (2011)
Ethnographic work on changes and
meanings of identity;
Ngrams (indirect evidence for
changing terms and diffusion to
general public)
Wage gap no lower where there are
non-discrimination laws; no
evidence re. occupation

Employer nondiscrimination policies
and extension of benefits
to partners/spouses
Residential nondiscrimination ordinances
and increased tolerance

Partner health benefits
(direct economic benefit)

Increased wellbeing and open-ness
about identity where employers
offer benefits

Residential dispersal
from gay enclaves

Legal Marriage/civil union

Rates of coupling;

Regional: evidence mixed but
increased openness over time in
conservative areas;
City: gay neighborhood to suburb
dispersal
No evidence about coupling rates;
Large increases in rates of selfreporting as spouses; biggest
increases where marriage is legal
Also increases in conservative nonmarriage states (Definition of
relationships changes, not just
legal)
No evidence for increased
parenting rate for lesbians; some
evidence for gay men.

Rates of marriage
Self-definition as
spouses

Second-parent and joint
adoption; adoption
agencies and fertility
treatment open to samesex couples

Increased parenting
rates;

Increased parenting by
choice, decreased
parenting through prior
heterosexual
relationships;

Probable increase in parenting by
choice
Higher adoption/foster rate in
liberal states

Increased adoption

Increase in adoption over time
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